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I.

INTRODUCTION

On a winter morning in 2009, Ronald Fleck, who was
indisputably intoxicated at the time, stabbed his romantic partner
1
once in the shoulder with a kitchen knife. Fleck was prosecuted
2
for second-degree assault in Minnesota state court. At trial, he
attempted to invoke the statutory defense of voluntary
3
intoxication.
Because voluntary intoxication can mitigate the
element of specific intent, Fleck’s case turned on whether the State
was required to prove that Fleck had the specific intent to injure
the victim. Going against precedent, the Minnesota Supreme
Court concluded that assault that results in bodily harm requires
only a general intent to act and not the specific intent to inflict
4
harm.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Fleck
underscores several vexing problems with the legislature’s
definition of assault and, more broadly, with the statutory
definitions of culpable mental states used throughout Minnesota’s
Criminal Code. This article argues that classifying an assault that
results in bodily harm as a general-intent offense essentially
imposes strict liability for any volitional physical act that produces
bodily harm. This notion is at odds with firmly embedded
1. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 305–06 (Minn. 2012).
2. Id. at 305.
3. Id. at 306.
4. See id. at 308–12. The case also drew the attention of battered-women
advocates. Several such organizations submitted a joint amicus brief to the
Minnesota Supreme Court. See Brief for Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women
et al. as Amici Curiae, Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303 (No. A10-0681), 2011 WL 7561619.
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principles of criminal jurisprudence and may have additional
consequences in the areas of criminal, civil, and administrative law.
The article sets forth several proposals for modifying Minnesota’s
criminal statutes to bring them in line with fundamental criminal
law principles and eliminate the collateral damage that results from
the supreme court’s continued reliance on the common law
general/specific intent dichotomy in interpreting criminal statutes.
II. MINNESOTA’S ASSAULT STATUTE
A.

Assault Defined

The criminal offense of assault is defined in the “Definitions”
section of Minnesota’s Criminal Code, Minnesota Statutes section
5
609.02. Subdivision 10 of that sect\ion provides: “‘Assault’ is: (1)
an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate
bodily harm or death; or (2) the intentional infliction of or attempt
6
to inflict bodily harm upon another.”
B.

Intent Defined

Section 609.02 also defines the terms “with intent to” and
7
“intentionally” in a separate subdivision. The relevant portions of
section 609.02, subdivision 9, provide:
8
Mental state. (1) When criminal intent is an element of a
5. Minnesota’s Criminal Code provides a single, general definition of
assault, which is incorporated into multiple specific assault offenses. First-degree
assault, for example, is an assault that results in “great bodily harm” or an assault
of “a peace officer or correctional employee by using or attempting to use deadly
force.” MINN. STAT. § 609.221, subdiv. 1, 2 (2012). See also id. §§ 609.222 (seconddegree assault), .223 (third-degree assault), .2231 (fourth-degree assault), .224
(fifth-degree assault). The criminal code contains separate provisions for the
offense of domestic assault. See id. §§ 609.2242, .2247. Section 609.2242, entitled
“Domestic Assault,” restates the general definition of assault provided by section
609.02. Id. § 609.2242, subdiv. 1.
6. § 609.02, subdiv. 10.
7. Section 609.02, subdivision 9, contains two additional provisions
regarding mental state, which are not relevant to the discussion here.
8. In drafting Minnesota’s criminal code in 1963, the legislature “borrowed”
from the Model Penal Code’s approach for identifying the mens rea required for
particular offenses. See State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 72–73 (Minn. 1996),
superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of May 6, 1997, ch. 96, § 7, 1997 Minn.
Laws 694, 700, as recognized in King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149, 159 (Minn. 2002).
Rather than using the general/specific intent dichotomy, which is susceptible to
confusion, the Model Penal Code divided mens rea into four categories: purpose,
knowledge, negligence, and recklessness. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 3

2013]

STATE V. FLECK

1483

crime in this chapter, such intent is indicated by the term
“intentionally,” the phrase “with intent to,” the phrase
“with intent that,” or some form of the verbs “know” or
“believe.”
(2) “Know” requires only that the actor believes that the
specified fact exists.
(3) “Intentionally” means that the actor either has a
purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or
believes that the act performed by the actor, if successful,
will cause that result. In addition, . . . the actor must have
knowledge of those facts which are necessary to make the
actor’s conduct criminal and which are set forth after the
word “intentionally.”
(4) “With intent to” or “with intent that” means that the
actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the
result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will
9
cause that result.
III. STATE V. FLECK
A.

Facts and Procedural History
1.

Facts

Ronald Fleck and K.W. lived together in Alexandria,
10
Minnesota. The morning of January 23, 2009, K.W. arrived home
11
to find an already-inebriated Fleck drinking in the kitchen. Fleck
called K.W.’s name, and, as she turned towards him, Fleck stabbed
K.W. near her shoulder with a large butcher knife and then walked
12
away.
When law enforcement officers arrived on the scene, they
found K.W. in a bathroom with a small puncture wound to her
13
chest near her shoulder. Fleck was sitting in a chair and, before
becoming unresponsive, told the officers that he had taken forty
14
15
sleeping pills. Both Fleck and K.W. were taken to the hospital.
(1962)).
9. § 609.02, subdiv. 9.
10. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Minn. 2012).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 305–06.
13. State v. Fleck, 797 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). The wound
was minor enough that it did not require stitches. Transcript of Trial at 289–90,
State v. Fleck, No. 21-CR-09-239 (Douglas Cnty. Dist. Ct. Nov. 3–4, 2009).
14. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306; Fleck, 797 N.W.2d at 735.
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Tests revealed that Fleck had a blood alcohol level of 0.315
16
g/dL —almost four times the legal limit for operating a motor
17
vehicle.
2.

Procedural History

Fleck was charged with a single count of second-degree assault
with a dangerous weapon under Minnesota Statutes section
18
The second-degree assault statute
609.222, subdivision 1.
references section 609.02, subdivision 10, for the definition of
assault. Although subdivision 10 describes two forms of assault—an
act committed with the intent to cause fear of bodily harm
(“assault-fear”) and the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict
19
bodily harm (“assault-harm”) —the complaint in Fleck’s case did
20
not specify a particular form of assault.
21
Fleck asserted a voluntary-intoxication defense and asked the
trial court to provide the jury with a voluntary-intoxication
22
instruction. The State objected to Fleck’s requested instruction,
15. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306.
16. Id.
17. See MINN. STAT. § 169A.20, subdiv. 1(5) (2012) (stating that a person is
guilty of driving while impaired if the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.08 or
greater).
18. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306. Second-degree assault is defined as follows:
“Whoever assaults another with a dangerous weapon may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than seven years or to payment of a fine of not more
than $14,000, or both.” § 609.222, subdiv. 1.
19. See § 609.02, subdiv. 10.
20. Criminal Complaint, State v. Fleck, No. 21-CR-09-239 (Douglas Cnty. Dist.
Ct. Jan. 30, 2009).
21. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306. For the language of section 609.075, see infra
Part III.C.1. Under this statute, which has essentially remained unchanged since
its adoption in 1963, see State v. Bonga, 278 Minn. 181, 185–86, 153 N.W.2d 127,
130 (1967), a defendant’s voluntary intoxication may be considered when
determining whether the defendant had the requisite intent to commit a crime.
See § 609.075; see also City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 466, 238
N.W.2d 851, 854–55 (1976). The defendant bears the burden of proving
voluntary intoxication. State v. O’Donnell, 280 Minn. 213, 221, 158 N.W.2d 699,
704 (1968).
22. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306. The pattern jury instruction for voluntary
intoxication provides:
In this case, the defendant has introduced evidence of intoxication. It is
not a defense to a crime that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of
the act if the defendant voluntarily became intoxicated. However, if it is
an element of a crime that the defendant had a particular intent, you
should consider whether the defendant was intoxicated, and if so,
whether the defendant was capable of forming the required intent. The
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arguing that the voluntary-intoxication defense applies only to
23
crimes with a specific-intent element. The State asked the court
to instead instruct the jury only as to assault-harm, which the State
characterized as a general-intent crime.
The trial court agreed with the State’s argument that assaultharm was a general-intent crime and, therefore, was ineligible for a
voluntary-intoxication instruction.
Ultimately, the trial court
instructed the jury that an assault can be committed in two ways—
by acting with intent to cause fear or by the intentional infliction of
bodily harm—and gave the jury a voluntary-intoxication
24
instruction.
But the court advised the jury that the voluntaryintoxication defense could only be considered to determine
whether Fleck was guilty of committing assault-fear and could not
25
apply to assault-harm. The trial court submitted separate verdict
26
forms to the jury for each form of assault. The jury convicted
Fleck of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, finding
that he had committed assault-harm against K.W. Fleck was
27
sentenced to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in a published opinion,
28
reversed Fleck’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. Relying
on recent precedent from the Minnesota Supreme Court that
defined assault as a specific-intent crime, the court of appeals
concluded that Fleck was entitled to a voluntary-intoxication

burden of establishing intoxication is on the defendant. The defendant
must prove the claim of intoxication by the greater weight of the
evidence. The greater weight of the evidence means that the evidence
must lead you to believe that it is more likely that the claim is true than
not true. If the evidence does not lead you to believe that it is more likely
that the claim is true than not true, then the claim has not been proven.
10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES,
MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CRIMINAL, CRIMJIG 7.03
(Stephen A. Forestell & Wayne A. Logan reporters, 5th ed. 2006).
23. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. The trial court also submitted to the jury verdict forms for the
lesser-included offense of fifth-degree assault in addition to the charged offense of
second-degree assault. State v. Fleck, 797 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
The misdemeanor offense of fifth-degree assault is simply an assault as defined by
Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 10. Compare § 609.224, subdiv. 1
(defining fifth-degree assault), with id. § 609.02, subdiv. 10.
27. See Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306. That sentence was the presumptive term for
second-degree assault under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. See id.
28. Fleck, 797 N.W.2d at 739.
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29

instruction for both forms of assault. The State appealed to the
Minnesota Supreme Court, which granted the State’s petition for
30
review.
C.

The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision
1.

The Defense of Voluntary Intoxication Is Only Available for
Specific-Intent Crimes

The Minnesota Supreme Court first considered whether the
statutory defense of voluntary intoxication applies to both general31
To decide this question, the
intent and specific-intent crimes.
court referred to the language of the voluntary-intoxication
32
statute. Minnesota Statutes section 609.075 provides:
An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication
is not less criminal by reason thereof, but when a
particular intent or other state of mind is a necessary
element to constitute a particular crime, the fact of
intoxication may be taken into consideration in
determining such intent or state of mind.
Engaging in a plain-language analysis of the statute, the
33
supreme court focused on the term “particular intent.” The court
found that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “particular”
34
is consistent with “specific” and inconsistent with “general.” The
court further noted that in its past decisions, the terms “particular
35
intent” and “specific intent” were used interchangeably.
The
court concluded, therefore, that the term “particular intent,” as
used in the voluntary-intoxication statute, refers only to specific36
intent crimes.
Stated otherwise, voluntary intoxication is only
29. Id. at 737–38 (discussing State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650, 656–57 (Minn.
2007); State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Minn. 1998)).
30. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 307.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1119 (6th ed. 1990)).
35. Id. (citing State v. Torres, 632 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Minn. 2001); City of
Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 466, 238 N.W.2d 851, 854–55 (1976)).
36. Id. On appeal, Fleck conceded that voluntary intoxication applies only to
specific-intent crimes. Brief for Appellant at 15, State v. Fleck, 797 N.W.2d 733
(Minn. Oct. 1, 2010) (No. A10-0681), 2010 WL 6644665. It could be argued,
however, that the phrase “or other state of mind,” which follows “particular intent”
in the voluntary-intoxication statute, in fact permits the use of the voluntaryintoxication defense for crimes requiring any mental state, including general
intent. See MINN. STAT. § 609.075 (2012).
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available as a defense to those offenses that require proof of
specific intent.
2.

Assault-Harm Is a General-Intent Crime

The supreme court then turned to Minnesota’s assault statute
to determine whether it describes a specific- or general-intent
37
Citing several treatises, the court stated that a generalcrime.
intent crime “simply prohibits a person from intentionally
38
engaging in the prohibited conduct.” The person must intend
the action but need not intend to accomplish any particular
39
result. By contrast, “a specific-intent crime requires an ‘intent to
40
cause a particular result.’” Specific intent refers to a mental state
41
that is above and beyond the mere will to engage in the act itself.
The supreme court remarked that the legislature regularly uses the
phrase “with intent to” as a means of expressing a specific-intent
42
requirement.
Turning to the definition of assault, the supreme court first
noted that section 609.02, subdivision 10, sets forth two definitions
of assault. The supreme court paid close attention to the statutory
definition of each, noting that assault-fear is “‘an act done with
intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or
43
death’” and assault-harm is “‘the intentional infliction of . . .
44
bodily harm upon another.’” The court took special notice of the
fact that the legislature used different language regarding intent
45
when defining the two types of assault. Relying in large part on
the fact that the legislature used the phrase “with intent to”—a
signal phrase for specific intent—only when defining assault-fear,
37.
38.
39.

Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citing 9 HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE:
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 44.3 (3d ed. 2001)).
40. Id. (quoting MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 39, § 44.3).
41. Id. (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(e) (2d
ed. 2003)).
42. Id. at 308–09 (citing State v. Mullen, 577 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Minn. 1998)).
In Mullen, the court observed that the language referencing specific intent
includes “‘intentionally,’ ‘with intent to,’ or ‘know.’” 577 N.W.2d at 510 (citing
State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 73–74 (Minn. 1996), superseded by statute, MINN.
STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 1(a) (1997), as recognized in Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 311 n.4).
43. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 10(1)
(2010)).
44. Id. (quoting § 609.02, subdiv. 10(2)).
45. Id.
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the court concluded that assault-harm is a general-intent crime.
The court stated:
Although the definition of assault-harm requires the State
to prove that the defendant intended to do the physical
act, nothing in the definition requires proof that the
defendant meant to violate the law or cause a particular
result.
If the Legislature intended to require an
additional, special mental element, it could have defined
assault-harm as “an act done with the intent to cause bodily
47
harm to another.”
Having previously held that voluntary intoxication is a defense to
only those crimes requiring specific intent, the court held that the
trial court properly instructed the jury and reinstated Fleck’s
48
conviction for second-degree assault with a deadly weapon.
3.

To the Extent that Other Minnesota Supreme Court Decisions
Suggested that Assault-Harm Is a Specific-Intent Crime, Those
Decisions Were Incorrect

In the final third of its opinion, the Minnesota Supreme Court
conceded that “imprecise language” in some of its prior opinions
49
As the court of appeals
led to “some confusion in the law.”
50
observed, the supreme court held in State v. Lindahl that “force” in
the context of a criminal-sexual-conduct offense, which the
51
legislature defined as an assault, required just general intent. But
the court of appeals relied on two more recent cases, State v.
52
53
Edrozo and State v. Vance, in which the supreme court explicitly
54
stated that assault-harm was a specific-intent offense.
Reviewing these cases in Fleck, the supreme court first
55
reaffirmed the analysis set forth in Lindahl. Lindahl was charged
56
with criminal sexual conduct involving force. The term “force”
46. Id.
47. Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 312.
49. Id. at 310.
50. 309 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1981).
51. State v. Fleck, 797 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (citing
Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d at 767).
52. 578 N.W.2d 719 (Minn. 1998).
53. 734 N.W.2d 650 (Minn. 2007).
54. Fleck, 797 N.W.2d at 737–38 (citing Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d at 723; Vance, 734
N.W.2d at 656, 657).
55. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. 2012).
56. Id. (citing Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d at 764).
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was defined as the commission of an assault or threat of an assault.
On appeal, Lindahl argued that he should have received a
58
voluntary-intoxication instruction. The supreme court disagreed,
holding that the assault at issue, which involved the infliction of
harm, was a general-intent crime: “‘[A]n assault involving infliction
of injury of some sort requires no abstract intent to do something
further, only an intent to do the prohibited physical act of
59
committing a battery.’” Although the court in Fleck acknowledged
that Lindahl involved criminal sexual conduct and did not
specifically address the separate offense of assault, the court
60
observed that the reasoning of the decision was sound. Thus, the
court concluded, the holding of Lindahl should be extended to
61
cases involving assault-harm.
Next, the court highlighted the factual circumstances in Edrozo
62
and Vance in an effort to explain their inconsistency with Lindahl.
The court reasoned that under the facts of Edrozo, which involved
allegations of just assault-fear, the court’s statement that “[a]ssault
is a specific-intent crime” encompassed only the assault-fear offense
63
and not assault-harm. In other words, in Edrozo, the court spoke
64
too broadly.
The court acknowledged that its analysis in Vance was likewise
65
inexact. At trial, Vance relied on a defense of accident, claiming
66
that he injured the victim when he fell on top of her. On appeal,
Vance argued that the trial court committed reversible error in
failing to provide the jury with a definition of assault, which
67
requires an intentional act. The supreme court agreed, noting
again that assault-harm was a specific-intent crime and holding that
the trial court’s erroneous instruction, which did not contain any
68
intent requirement, necessitated a new trial.
The Fleck court recognized that Vance incorrectly stated that

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. (citing Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d at 767).
Id. (citing Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d at 766).
Id. (quoting Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d at 767).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 310–12.
Id. at 311 (quoting State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Minn. 1998)).
See id.
See id. at 311–12.
Id. at 311 (citing State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650, 654 (Minn. 2007)).
See id. (citing Vance, 734 N.W.2d at 657, 662–63).
Id. (citing Vance, 734 N.W.2d at 662–63).
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both assault-fear and assault-harm were specific-intent crimes. But
the court explained that its “chief concern [in Vance] was that the
erroneous jury instruction allowed the jury to find Vance guilty of
an assault-harm offense even if they believed the victim’s injuries
were the result of Vance’s nonvolitional act—accidentally falling on
70
the victim.” The outcome of Vance was therefore correct, even
though the court relied on a faulty premise in arriving at the
71
result.
Because the court distinguished its analyses in Edrozo and Vance
from its holding in Fleck, the court declined to specifically overrule
72
either decision.
The court noted, however, that the confusion
73
created by the past decisions “is regrettable” and explicitly
rejected the “erroneous discussion of specific-intent and general74
intent crimes in Vance.”
IV. PROBLEMATIC EFFECTS OF THE COURT’S RULING IN FLECK
On a positive note, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in
Fleck avoided the domestic-assault policy concerns that could have
resulted if defendants charged with assault-harm were permitted to
75
argue voluntary intoxication as a defense. But in almost all other
respects, the court’s opinion in Fleck is troubling in both theory and
practice. First, the court’s statutory analysis of the definition of
assault-harm did not address all of the language in the statute.
Second, the court in effect made assault-harm a strict-liability crime
by failing to impose a mens rea requirement for each element of
the offense and by conflating the principles of general intent and
volitional acts. In creating a strict-liability crime, the court
essentially criminalized all physical acts that result in harm to
69. Id. at 311–12.
70. Id. at 312.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 311–12.
73. Id. at 311 n.4.
74. Id. at 311.
75. In their amicus brief, the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women, the
Battered Women’s Legal Advocacy Project, and the Battered Women’s Justice
Project cited research from the U.S. Department of Justice purporting that more
than one-third of offenders incarcerated for violent crimes were using alcohol at
the time of their arrest. See Brief for Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women et
al., supra note 4, at 8. The amici argued that “[a] cultural tendency to trivialize
domestic violence, especially when the abuser has been drinking, further suggests
that juries will acquit many defendants accused of domestic assault who invoke the
intoxication defense.” Id. at 10–11 (citation omitted).
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another person, regardless of the intent or motivations of the actor.
A third problem with Fleck, therefore, is that the court’s broad
definition of assault could have far-reaching effects on other areas
of the law, such as civil suits for assault and battery, homicide cases,
and administrative law procedures.
A.

Incomplete Statutory Interpretation

Fleck presents an abbreviated analysis of Minnesota Statutes
76
In finding that assault-harm
section 609.02, subdivision 10.
constitutes a general-intent crime, the court simply states, “The
forbidden conduct is a physical act, which results in bodily harm
77
upon another.” But the language of section 609.02, subdivision
10(2), in fact states: “‘Assault’ is . . . the intentional infliction of . . .
bodily harm upon another.” The court’s conclusion that “[t]he
78
forbidden conduct is a physical act” ignores the statute’s plain
79
language requiring a showing of “intentional infliction.”
First, given that the court found the legislature’s use of “with
intent to” in the assault-fear definition to mean that the legislature
80
intended to make assault-fear a specific-intent crime, it is unclear
why the use of the word “intentional” did not do the same for
assault-harm. Under Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision
9(1), the terms “with intent to” and “intentionally” are both
indications that “criminal intent is an element of a crime.” Both
81
terms have almost identical definitions, and the Minnesota
Supreme Court has found that both “with intent to” and
82
“intentionally” are references to specific intent. The court in Fleck
did not address the definition of “intentionally” set out in section
609.02, subdivision 9, nor did it explain why the adverb
“intentionally” signifies a specific-intent requirement but the
adjective form of “intentional” found in section 609.02, subdivision
10, does not.
83
Second, the word “inflict” is a transitive verb, so it requires a
76. See Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 309–10.
77. Id. at 309.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 10(2) (2010).
80. See Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308–09, 308 n.3.
81. Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 9(3) (2012), with id. § 609.02,
subdiv. 9(4); see also Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308 n.3.
82. See State v. Mullen, 577 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Minn. 1998) (citation omitted).
83. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 900 (5th
ed. 2011).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss5/3

12

Gaitas and Polachek: State v. Fleck: The Intentional Infliction of General Intent upon

1492

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:5

direct object in order to complete its meaning—a person inflicts
something. Therefore, “infliction” is not just “a physical act”; it is
defined as “[t]he act or process of imposing or meting out
84
something unpleasant.”
The assault definition provides the
85
“something unpleasant” that is inflicted—bodily harm.
Therefore, the plain meaning of section 609.02, subdivision 10(2),
is that an assault is the intentional act or process of imposing or
meting out bodily harm upon another. And the conduct that is
prohibited is imposing bodily harm upon another, not just a physical act.
Recognizing that section 609.02, subdivision 10(2), prohibits
the act of imposing bodily harm, the question of whether assaultharm is a general- or specific-intent crime becomes more difficult.
The court in Fleck cited definitions of “general intent” from several
86
sources.
These definitions all state something a bit different,
creating confusion about the meaning that the court was
attributing to “general intent.” And the definition the court cited
from LaFave’s seminal treatise on criminal law—that general intent
requires only an “intention to make the bodily movement which
87
constitutes the act which the crime requires” —is the same
principle that the court later cites as a requirement for both
general and specific intent: that every crime requires a volitional
88
act.
Fleck concludes that “the definition of assault-harm requires
the State to prove that the defendant intended to do the physical
89
act.”
The physical act is the conduct forbidden by the plain
language of the statute—imposing or meting out bodily harm upon
another. So assault-harm requires the State to prove that the
defendant intended to impose or mete out bodily harm to another.
One could invoke LaFave’s broad definition of general intent and
84. Id. at 900–01.
85. § 609.02, subdiv. 10(2). It would be either redundant or absurd to say
that an assault is the intentional act of imposing something unpleasant that results
in bodily harm. If the act is unpleasant because it results in pain, to add a bodily
harm requirement is redundant. And it is absurd to think that unpleasantness
associated with any other sensations (e.g., aural unpleasantness from a
neighboring residence) could constitute assault.
86. See Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308.
87. Id. (quoting LAFAVE, supra note 41).
88. Id. at 309 (citing MCCARR & NORBY, supra note 39, § 44.5). In fact,
LaFave’s own treatise uses the phrase quoted in Fleck when discussing the volitional
requirement applicable to all crimes and two paragraphs later when discussing
general intent. See LAFAVE, supra note 41.
89. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 309.
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say that assault-harm is a general-intent crime that merely requires
the intent to make the bodily movement underlying the imposition
90
of bodily harm.
But the more obvious interpretation of the
definition is its plain language—that assault-harm requires the
State to prove that the defendant intended to impose or mete out
bodily harm upon another. Requiring the State to show that the
defendant intended to impose bodily harm makes assault-harm a
specific-intent crime because the defendant must intend the result
of his or her action.
B.

Assault-Harm as a Strict-Liability Crime

Much of the difficulty in characterizing assault-harm as either a
general- or specific-intent crime stems from the fact that,
historically, those terms were used in different ways to mean
different things and then repurposed to the point that the United
States Supreme Court has called the distinction “ambiguous and
91
elastic” and “[a] source of a good deal of confusion.” In addition,
some of the court’s difficulty is the result of its failure to recognize,
as the Model Penal Code does, that mens rea should be required
92
for every element of a crime.
Assault-harm has two basic elements (in addition to the
general principle of all crimes requiring a person to act
volitionally): a conduct element and a result element. Fleck
established a general-intent requirement with respect to the
conduct element but did not impose any mens rea requirement as
to the result element. Therefore, under Fleck, if a defendant
performs a physical act of his own volition, his act constitutes an
assault-harm if it results in harm to another person, regardless of
whether the defendant had any desire to harm another. In other
words, the court’s decision effectively made assault-harm a strict93
liability crime.
90. See LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 5.2(e).
91. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403–04 (1980).
92. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1985) (“[A] person is not guilty of an
offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law
may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.”); see also Bailey,
444 U.S. at 406 (“‘[C]lear analysis requires that the question of the kind of
culpability required to establish the commission of an offense be faced separately
with respect to each material element of the crime.’”) (quoting MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02 cmt. 1)).
93. Some commentators argue that there is no distinction between generalintent and specific-intent crimes. See, e.g., MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 39, § 44.5
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A strict-liability crime is one that imposes criminal liability in
94
As the Minnesota Supreme Court
the absence of mens rea.
recently noted, “The Supreme Court of the United States has stated
95
that ‘offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored.’”
Under an elemental approach to mens rea, the court in Fleck
undoubtedly imposed strict liability on the result element of
assault-harm. And although the court described the mens rea
requirement for the conduct element as general intent, the low
burden of proof Fleck placed upon the State is consistent with strict
liability.
“Mens rea is the element of a crime that requires ‘the
96
defendant know the facts that make his conduct illegal.’” Because
the supreme court in Fleck defined the prohibited conduct for
assault-harm in terms of the effect that a physical act has on another
person, the fact that makes the defendant’s conduct illegal is the
harm suffered by the victim. Because any harm the defendant
causes must necessarily follow after the defendant’s act, it is
impossible for the defendant to know, at the time of the act, the
facts that make his conduct illegal. Therefore, the supreme court’s
definition of assault-harm in Fleck lacks a mens rea requirement.
The court’s conclusion that assault-harm requires general
intent overlooks the fact that the only form of “intent” that the
State must prove is that the defendant’s actions were not
involuntary reflexes. That volitional element is not a mens rea
requirement but the basic requirement that a crime include an
97
act. As the court itself stated in Fleck, “regardless of whether an
offense is described as a specific- or general-intent crime, a
defendant must voluntarily do an act or voluntarily fail to perform
98
an act.”
But the court nonetheless went on to conflate the
principle of general intent and the universal requirement of a
(“‘[S]trict liability’ offenses are often merely ‘general intent’ crimes, since they
assume that the act itself was done intentionally and consciously; otherwise it is
likely to be defensible as mere accident, or as the result of mental illness.”
(footnote omitted)). Regardless of the terminology employed, imposing liability
in the absence of fault is generally disfavored. See State v. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d
816, 818 (Minn. 2012) (citations omitted).
94. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 (1994); see also LAFAVE,
supra note 41, § 5.5.
95. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d at 818 (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 606).
96. Id. (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 605).
97. See LAFAVE, supra note 41, §§ 5.2(e), 6.1.
98. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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volitional act, requiring only the latter but labeling it as the former.
Assault-harm, under Fleck, therefore, requires no actual showing of
mens rea and is thus a strict-liability crime.
C.

The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine

Under Fleck, an assault-harm crime occurs when a defendant
commits any physical act of the defendant’s own volition that
results in bodily harm to another person, regardless of the
defendant’s underlying desire, intent, or motive. That holding
does not adequately define the conduct prohibited under
Minnesota’s assault statutes. The court stated, “The forbidden
conduct is a physical act, which results in bodily harm upon
99
another.” “[A] physical act” encompasses all conduct. Although
some provisions among the assault statutes require more specific
100
conduct—i.e., a past pattern of child abuse, use of a deadly
101
102
weapon, the transfer of bodily fluids or feces —others simply
103
prohibit an “assault” as defined in section 609.02, subdivision 10.
Under Fleck, whether a person’s conduct constitutes an assault
104
And because
depends solely upon its effect on others.
prohibition of “a physical act” covers such a broad range of
conduct, a person cannot know for certain whether his conduct was
prohibited until after he has acted and observed the effects of his
conduct.
Uncertainty in criminal statutes can violate the “due process
standards of definiteness under both the United States
105
Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution.”
Just prosecution
requires fair notice to the offender that his conduct is forbidden by
106
To ensure fair notice, criminal statutes may be
statute.
challenged as unconstitutionally vague. The void-for-vagueness
doctrine requires that criminal statutes define an offense (1) with
sufficient clarity and certainty that a person of ordinary intelligence
can understand what conduct is prohibited and (2) in a manner
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. MINN. STAT. § 609.223, subdiv. 2 (2012).
101. Id. § 609.222.
102. Id. § 609.2231, subdiv. 3(2).
103. See id. §§ 609.221, subdiv. 1; .223, subdiv. 1; .224, subdiv. 1(2).
104. Cf. State v. Ott, 291 Minn. 72, 75, 189 N.W.2d 377, 379 (1971) (noting
that, in the assault-fear statute, “the intent of the actor, as contrasted with the
effect upon the victim, becomes the focal point for inquiry”).
105. State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1985).
106. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
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that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
107
of the law.
Under Fleck, it is questionable whether assault-harm crimes
meet both prongs of the void-for-vagueness test. Because assaultharm is an act that results in bodily harm to another, a person
cannot know whether his conduct is prohibited until he knows the
effect of that conduct. And the potentially limitless spectrum of
conduct encompassed within the court’s definition of assault-harm
in Fleck requires law enforcement to exercise a great deal of
discretion, which could lead to arbitrary or varying degrees of
enforcement.
Granted, in most circumstances, an individual can predict
whether his or her act will inflict harm on another. Nevertheless, it
is not hard to imagine factual scenarios in which a person’s
innocent actions result in bodily harm to another. For example,
assume a defendant is walking through a crowded shopping mall
and trying to pass a slower customer. The defendant pushes past
the slower customer, who is caught off-balance and falls, breaking
his or her leg. Had the customer not fallen, the defendant’s
conduct would have been lawful. But pursuant to Fleck, the
defendant committed assault-harm; depending on the amount of
harm the customer suffered, the defendant could be charged with
108
first-, third-, or fifth-degree assault.
It is irrelevant whether the
defendant intended to cause injury to the other customer; it may
even be irrelevant whether the defendant intended to push the
other customer, so long as the defendant was walking past the
customer of his or her own volition.
D.

Potential Collateral Consequences of Fleck

The example in the previous section highlights the absurd
results that may stem from the lack of a mens rea requirement and
the broad definition of assault-harm that the court announced in
Fleck. This section illustrates the effect the court’s decision could
have in other areas of the law, including civil suits, felony-murder
prosecutions, and administrative law provisions.
107. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); accord State v.
Bussman, 741 N.W.2d 79, 83 (Minn. 2007).
108. See §§ 609.221, subdiv. 1 (defining first-degree assault to require “great
bodily harm”), .223, subdiv. 1 (defining third-degree assault to require “substantial
bodily harm”), .224, subdiv. 1 (requiring only “bodily harm” for fifth-degree
assault).
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Civil Suits for Tortious Assault

The court’s decision in Fleck will make it easier to convict a
defendant of assault-harm because, beyond establishing that the
defendant’s conduct was volitional, the State does not need to
address the defendant’s mental state. That change could affect
civil actions seeking damages from the defendant for assault
and/or battery. The common law tort of assault does not involve
physical contact between the parties; instead, assault is “an unlawful
threat to do bodily harm to another with present ability to carry the
109
threat into effect.” Common law battery, on the other hand, is an
intentional, unpermitted, harmful, or offensive contact with
110
another person.
In other words, the tort of assault is assault-fear
as defined in Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 10(1),
and assault-harm under that statute is more akin to the common
111
law tort of battery.
In cases where a criminal defendant was convicted of a crime
against a person and the victim or, in actions for wrongful death,
the victim’s family files suit for civil damages arising from the
defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff often moves for summary
judgment or partial summary judgment on the issue of the
defendant’s liability. These motions are based on the legal theory
of collateral estoppel, which “precludes the relitigation of issues
which are both identical to those issues already litigated by the
parties in a prior action and necessary and essential to the resulting
112
judgment.”
“A criminal conviction can be used in a subsequent
civil action to preclude argument by the convicted party on issues

109.
110.

Dahlin v. Fraser, 206 Minn. 476, 478, 288 N.W. 851, 852 (1939).
See Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Minn. 1990); 4A MINN. DIST.
JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY
INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL, CIVJIG 60.25 (Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp
reporters, 5th ed. 2012).
111. See State v. Ott, 291 Minn. 72, 75, 189 N.W.2d 377, 379 n.3 (1971)
(noting that the assault statute “punishes without distinction both what the
common law regarded as ‘criminal assault’ and what was known as ‘civil assault’”).
At common law, an assault was simply an attempted battery. See Rollin M. Perkins,
An Analysis of Assault and Attempts to Assault, 47 MINN. L. REV. 71, 71 (1963); see also
Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 205, 208 N.W. 814, 815 (1926) (“An assault is
an inchoate battery.”). Consequently, the commission of a battery necessarily
included a completed assault. Perkins, supra, at 73. Rather than charging
defendants with assault and battery, many jurisdictions merged the two crimes
together. Id. at 89.
112. Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704
(Minn. 1982).
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113

conclusively proved in the criminal trial.”
Because collateral
estoppel is an equitable doctrine, the court can use its discretion
when deciding whether to apply collateral estoppel to any given
114
case.
Courts generally invoke collateral estoppel when all of the
following factors are present: (1) the issue to be decided is identical
to one adjudicated in a prior action, (2) the prior action concluded
with a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party to be estopped
was a party to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party to be
estopped had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the issue at
115
the prior proceeding.
If a victim sues a defendant who was convicted of a crime
involving assault-harm, the last three prerequisites for collateral
estoppel will almost certainly be present. The defendant would
have been a party in the criminal case against him and would have
116
had an opportunity to dispute the charges at trial. And the court
would have entered judgment against the defendant at the time of
117
The question that will remain for the court is
his sentencing.
whether a crime involving assault-harm, as defined in Fleck and
Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 10(2), is sufficiently
similar to the tort of battery to consider the matter already decided.
Pursuant to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of
assault-harm in Fleck, a defendant can be convicted of a crime
involving assault-harm if the defendant committed a voluntary act
that resulted in bodily harm upon another.
As previously
discussed, assault-harm does not require “proof that the defendant
118
meant to violate the law or cause a particular result.” On the civil
113. Fain v. Andersen, 816 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012); see also Ill.
Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. 2003); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 552–53, 163 N.W.2d 289, 293 (1968); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 cmt. e (1982) (“There are two basic patterns for
applying issue preclusion in favor of a third party. . . . [One] situation is where the
person harmed by the conduct that was criminally prosecuted then brings an
action for civil redress against the wrongdoer for the consequences of the
conduct. . . . Although the courts were somewhat slower in coming to apply issue
preclusion in the latter situation than in the former, it is now settled that
preclusion should apply in both.”).
114. See Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 662 N.W.2d at 532; Green v. City of Coon Rapids,
485 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
115. See Fain, 816 N.W.2d at 701.
116. See id. at 702.
117. See id. at 701 (citing Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732
N.W.2d 209, 220 (Minn. 2007)) (“A judgment is final, for purposes of res judicata,
when entered, notwithstanding a pending appeal.”).
118. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012).
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side, a defendant is liable for a battery if the defendant
119
intentionally caused harmful or offensive contact with another.
With respect to intentional torts, the term “intent” means “that the
actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes
120
that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”
Therefore, to be liable for battery, the defendant must intend to
cause a harmful or offensive contact, or the circumstances must be
121
such that the defendant’s intent can be inferred. Because battery
requires the plaintiff to prove intent to cause a result—an element
not present in the definition of assault-harm under Fleck—a
conviction for a crime involving assault-harm is not identical to civil
liability for battery. For that reason, a defendant convicted of an
assault-harm offense should not be precluded from arguing his
innocence during a subsequent civil trial. Courts, therefore, will be
more likely to deny summary judgment motions based on collateral
estoppel, requiring the court and the parties to expend additional
resources to relitigate the issue of the defendant’s liability.
2.

Felony Murder

In addition to the possible civil consequences stemming from
an assault conviction, the relaxed standards promulgated in Fleck
could affect criminal charging practices and plea bargaining. As an
example, it is not uncommon for prosecutors to either charge or
submit a lesser-included instruction to the jury for felony murder
when the defendant is charged with other felonies and first-degree
murder. In that scenario, if the prosecution did not meet its
burden of proof on the more severe charges, the felony-murder
charge permits the jury to find the defendant guilty of murder on
the basis of the defendant’s other felonious acts.
According to common law, “‘if one intends to do another
122
felony, and undesignedly kills a man, this is also murder.’”
119. 4A MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES,
supra note 110.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965); accord 4A MINN. DIST.
JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY
INSTRUCTION GUIDES–CIVIL, CIVJIG 60.10 (Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp
reporters, 5th ed. 2006).
121. See, e.g., R.W. v. T.F., 528 N.W.2d 869, 872 (Minn. 1995) (explaining the
intent element of a battery claim and noting that the defendant’s intent to cause a
result was the relevant intent inquiry rather than the defendant’s intent to act).
122. State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn. 2003) (quoting Rudolph
J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 763,
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Minnesota codified that principle as second-degree felony murder.
A defendant may be found guilty of second-degree felony murder if
he or she “causes the death of a human being, without intent to
effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to
123
commit a felony offense.”
Second-degree felony murder has no
124
intent requirement. To find a defendant guilty of second-degree
felony murder, the prosecution need only prove that (1) the
defendant’s conduct caused the victim’s death and (2) at the time
of causing the death, the defendant was committing, or attempting
125
to commit, a proper predicate felony offense.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly held that assault
126
is a proper predicate offense to second-degree felony murder.
Applying the court’s ruling in Fleck to a charge of second-degree
felony murder while committing second-degree assault—the
degree of assault charged in Fleck—the prosecution can convict a
defendant upon proof of only five broad elements: (1) the
127
(2) while committing
defendant caused the victim’s death
128
second-degree assault,
which requires proof that (3) the
129
defendant acted as a result of his or her free will and (4) inflicted
130
(5) while using a dangerous
bodily harm upon another
131
weapon.
Pursuant to Fleck, the only mental state that the
prosecution must prove is the defendant’s exercise of free will,
which is lacking only in those rare instances of reflexive twitches

765 (1999) (quoting SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 947 (George Chase ed., 4th ed. 1938))).
123. MINN. STAT. § 609.19, subdiv. 2(1) (2012).
124. State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 51 (Minn. 1996). The CRIMJIG for seconddegree felony murder includes the following instruction to the jury: “It is not
necessary for the State to prove the defendant had an intent to effect the death of
[the victim], but it must prove that defendant committed or attempted to commit
the underlying felony.” 10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 22, at 11.30.
125. See 10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES, supra note 22.
126. See, e.g., Cole, 542 N.W.2d at 53; State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 833–34
(Minn. 1987); State v. Galvan, 374 N.W.2d 269, 270 (Minn. 1985); State v. Nurmi,
336 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Minn. 1983).
127. See 10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES, supra note 22.
128. See id.
129. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012).
130. 10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES, supra note 22, at 13.10.
131. See id.
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132

and defective car brakes.
The fact that Fleck has essentially transformed assault-harm into
a strict-liability crime is particularly concerning in the context of
felony murder because the offense of second-degree felony murder
133
has no intent requirement.
Instead, the “felony murder rule”
says that because the defendant committed a felony that posed a
special danger to human life, the law will impute malice in the
defendant’s conduct that unintentionally caused the victim’s
134
death.
In other words, the felony murder rule “regards the
commission of a felony as conclusive evidence of homicidal
135
But according to Fleck, a person whose volitional
malice.”
conduct causes bodily harm to another is guilty of assault-harm,
even if the defendant’s actions were both legal and lacking any
intent to harm the other person. It is illogical to reason that the
commission of a benign, lawful act proves homicidal malice,
particularly when the court has previously stated that “a person is
136
deemed malicious when he does an act intending to injure another.”
Returning to the example of the hasty shopper, assume the
defendant volitionally pushed past the other customer, who fell
and sustained a fatal head injury. Despite the fact that the
defendant did not intend to inflict any harm upon the victim, the
defendant could be charged with unintentional felony murder with
137
a predicate offense of first-degree assault.
And from the single
volitional act of pushing past the customer, the law presumes the
defendant acted with homicidal malice.
132. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 309.
133. See State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d. 880, 882 (Minn. 1992) (“[F]elony
murder remains an anomaly in the law of homicide. With the exception of
involuntary manslaughter, . . . it is the only form of homicide not requiring proof
of a specific mental element.”).
134. See State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 51 (Minn. 1996) (citing Branson, 487
N.W.2d at 881). Note that imputing malice in the defendant’s conduct is distinct
from the doctrine of transferred intent. In the latter, the intent requirement of
Crime A serves as a substitute for the intent requirement of Crime B. But
imputing malice presumes the existence of the mental state required for Crime B
from the commission of Crime A. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The FelonyMurder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 455–56
(1985).
135. Michael C. Gregerson, Note, Criminal Law—Dangerous, Not Deadly:
Possession of a Firearm Distinguished from Use Under the Felony-Murder Rule—State v.
Anderson, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 607, 611 (2004) (citing George P. Fletcher,
Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 SW. U. L. REV. 413, 415–16 (1980)).
136. State v. Jankowitz, 175 Minn. 409, 410, 221 N.W. 533, 533 (1928)
(emphasis added).
137. See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.19, subdiv. 2(1), .221, subdiv. 1 (2012).
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But precedential case law places a gloss on the statutory
language of Minnesota Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 2(1),
that may restrain absurd results from Fleck. The plain language of
the second-degree felony murder statute appears to authorize all
138
but three felonies as predicate offenses. The Minnesota Supreme
Court, however, has held that predicate crimes for felony murder
139
must pose a “special danger to human life.”
When deciding
whether a particular felony constitutes a special danger to human
life, the court examines the crime from two perspectives: (1) the
elements of the felony in the abstract and (2) the facts of that
particular case and the circumstances surrounding the commission
140
of the felony.
For example, in State v. Anderson, the supreme
court distinguished between possession of a firearm by an ineligible
141
person and actual use of a firearm. Because the former “does not
require an act of violence in carrying out the crime,” the court held
that the offense of felon in possession of a firearm was not a
142
predicate offense to second-degree felony murder.
Although
assault-harm, as a crime against the person, will always contain
143
elements indicative of a special danger to human life, the court
will apparently also consider the specific circumstances of the
crime and the acts of the offender. That gloss may discourage
more liberal and creative charging under section 609.19,
subdivision 2(1), in the wake of Fleck.
Additionally, the fact that a defendant could be convicted of
second-degree felony murder for acting without malice could affect
the use of lesser-included offenses, such as manslaughter. “A lesser
offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if it is impossible
144
to commit the latter without also committing the former.”
In
Minnesota, every lesser degree of homicide is a lesser-included
138. Explicitly excluded from the possible predicate felonies for seconddegree felony murder are those crimes that serve as predicates to first-degree
felony murder—criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force
or violence, or a drive-by shooting. See id. §§ 609.19, subdiv. 2(1) (second-degree
felony murder), .185(a) (first-degree felony murder).
139. See State v. Back, 341 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 1983); accord State v.
Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 700–01 (Minn. 2003).
140. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701.
141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting with approval the district court’s order).
143. See State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 53 (Minn. 1996) (“[A]ssault in the
second degree itself forms a proper predicate felony to a felony murder
conviction—assault is not a property crime, but a crime against the person.”).
144. State v. Roden, 384 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Minn. 1986).
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145

offense.
Specifically, first- and second-degree manslaughter and
third-degree murder are lesser-included offenses of felony
146
murder.
Theoretically, then, a person who committed seconddegree felony murder must have also committed third-degree
murder and first- and second-degree manslaughter. But unlike a
charge of unintentional murder while committing an assault, most
lesser-included offenses each have some requirement of a guilty
mind, such as a depraved mind, the heat of passion, or
147
negligence. Therefore, a defendant charged with second-degree
murder while committing an assault will have unusually limited
148
opportunities for instructing the jury on lesser-included offenses.

145. See MINN. STAT. § 609.04, subdiv. 1 (2012) (stating that a lesser-included
offense may be a lesser degree of the same crime); State v. Leinweber, 303 Minn.
414, 421, 228 N.W.2d 120, 125 (1975); accord Cole, 542 N.W.2d at 50.
146. See, e.g., State v. Grigsby, 818 N.W.2d 511, 518–19 (Minn. 2012) (stating
that second-degree manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of second-degree
felony murder); State v. Peou, 579 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Minn. 1998) (“[T]here is no
question that first-degree manslaughter is an included offense within the charge of
felony murder. . . .”).
147. See §§ 609.195(a), .20(1), .205(1), (3).
148. The Minnesota Court of Appeals faced a related and interesting problem
in the recent case of State v. Rubio-Segura, No. A11-2246, 2012 WL 5381843 (Minn.
Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2012). The appellant’s argument noted that the crimes of
second-degree murder while committing a felony assault, Minn. Stat. § 609.19,
subdiv. 2(1) (2008), and first-degree manslaughter while committing a
misdemeanor assault, id. § 609.20(2), are identical. Rubio-Segura, 2012 WL
5381843, at *2. Under both statutes, the State must prove that the defendant, in
committing an assault—a volitional physical act that resulted in some degree of
bodily harm—caused the death of another. See 10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N,
COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 22, at 11.29, 11.46. The
only difference between the two crimes is the degree of bodily force inflicted—
misdemeanor assault under Minnesota Statutes section 609.224, subdivision 1(2),
requires the infliction of bodily harm, and felony assault under Minnesota Statutes
section 609.221, subdivision 1, requires the infliction of great bodily harm. But, as
the appellant in Rubio-Segura argued, the fact that the homicide and manslaughter
charges require the assault to have caused the victim’s death, the degree of bodily
harm inflicted must necessarily have been “great” as defined by statute. RubioSegura, 2012 WL 5381843, at *2 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 8 (2012)).
The appellant further argued that “because first-degree assault is equivalent to
fifth-degree assault when death results from the assault, the criminal statutes
governing second-degree unintentional felony murder based on first-degree
assault and first-degree misdemeanor manslaughter based on fifth-degree assault
have the same elements but different penalties.” Id. The appellant therefore
contended that the statutes conflicted and the manslaughter statute, being the
more specific of the two, should control. Id. The court of appeals declined to
address the appellant’s argument because it was raised for the first time on appeal.
Id. at *3.
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Other Collateral Consequences for Defendants

Finally, in addition to the collateral consequences that
accompany a quick conviction for assault, an individual may suffer
consequences from the court’s decision in Fleck without ever being
charged or convicted. Several federal and state statutes and
regulations impose legal consequences on individuals based on the
149
The most notable
mere commission of a crime or an arrest.
example is the Minnesota Department of Human Services (“DHS”)
150
Background Studies Act (“BSA”).
The BSA requires anyone age
thirteen years or older who works with or for licensed DHS facilities
151
to undergo a background check for suitability and security.
Examples of professionals who must undergo this background
152
check include nurses, personal care attendants, social workers,
153
and surgical technicians.
And if the individual seeks to provide
DHS services from their household, all members of household
154
During the
must also undergo the background check.
background check, “if the commissioner has reasonable cause to
believe the information is pertinent to the disqualification of an
individual,” the Commissioner may review “arrest and investigative
information” from a variety of sources, including the Minnesota
Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, county attorneys, county
155
sheriffs, local police, the courts, and the FBI. After reviewing this
information, the DHS Commissioner must disqualify an individual
if a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the individual has
149. For example, nonimmigrant visitors and tourists who commit any felony
must be automatically deported. 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(g) (2012). And immigrants who
are found to pose a danger to the community of the United States are ineligible
for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). In Minnesota, a person
charged with a violent felony cannot be licensed as a school bus driver until that
individual is found not guilty of the charge. MINN. R. 7414.0400, subpt. 3 (2012).
150. MINN. STAT. §§ 245C.01–.34.
151. See id. § 245C.03.
152. See Thompson v. Comm’r of Health, 778 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2010) (discussing a social worker who was disqualified from jobs that
involved any contact with facilities licensed by DHS because he was charged with a
drug offense, but the charges were dropped after he completed a diversion
program).
153. See Awes v. Minn. Dep’t of Health, No. A05-220, 2005 WL 3111848 (Minn.
Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2005) (reviewing denial of a request for reconsideration of a
relator who had been employed at a hospital as a surgical technician for five years
when his background check revealed a fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct
charge in his juvenile record).
154. § 245C.03, subdiv. 1(a)(2), (5).
155. Id. § 245C.08, subdiv. 3.
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committed certain enumerated crimes, regardless of whether the
156
crime was a felony, gross misdemeanor, or misdemeanor.
Commission of an assault—regardless of whether an arrest or
conviction followed—results in either a permanent or fifteen-year
157
disqualification. Under Fleck, a person who has done a volitional
act that resulted in bodily harm to another person has committed
an assault of some degree and will be disqualified from providing
services requiring licensing from the DHS.
V. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
A.

Adopt the Model Penal Code Mental States and Impose a Purpose,
Knowledge, or Recklessness Requirement for Assault-Harm Crimes

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fleck decision illuminates a
significant problem with the criminal code’s definitions of “mental
state.” Notwithstanding the legislature’s intent to depart from the
common law general/specific intent dichotomy in drafting
158
Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 9, the definitions
of mental states are imprecise enough that Minnesota courts still
revert to the common law concepts in interpreting criminal
159
statutes, such as the assault statute.
Reliance on the common law general/specific intent
dichotomy is problematic for a few reasons. First, these concepts
have led to “confusion” and “consternation” among courts that
160
have grappled with them, including the United States Supreme
161
In jurisdictions where this distinction persists, there is a
Court.

156. Id. § 245C.14, subdiv. 1(a)(2).
157. Id. §§ 245C.15, subdiv. 1(a) (imposing a permanent disqualification for
first- and second-degree assault), 245C.15, subdiv. 2(a) (imposing a fifteen-year
disqualification for assault in the third, fourth, or fifth degree).
158. See State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 72–73 (Minn. 1996), superseded by
statute, MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 1(a) (1997).
159. See State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012); see also State v.
Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Minn. 1998); Orsello, 554 N.W.2d at 72; State v.
Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Minn. 1981); State v. Cogger, 802 N.W.2d 407,
409–11 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
160. Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law
and Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 356 (2001) (quoting
People v. Colantuono, 865 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal. 1994)).
161. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000) (splitting 5-4 on
question of whether federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1994),
required general or specific intent).
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162

lack of consistency across appellate decisions.
Indeed, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has been criticized for its inconsistent
163
application of the concepts of specific and general intent.
Second, the common law general/specific intent dichotomy
164
Where there is
provides ample room for judicial interpretation.
opportunity for interpretation about the mental state required for
a crime, courts may simply apply their own policy ideas in assigning
165
a particular mens rea requirement.
Some courts explicitly
166
recognize that policy implications should be considered.
Other
courts do not acknowledge the policy considerations underlying
their decisions and instead purport to rely on purely legal
167
analyses. The danger with such practices, however, is that courts
are crossing over into the exclusive legislative function of defining
162. See generally Batey, supra note 160, at 367–99.
163. See MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 39, § 44.3 n.6 (observing that “[t]here
is a lack of consistency” in Minnesota Supreme Court opinions addressing general
and specific intent and that opinions “on occasion fail to cite important
authorities and principles”).
164. Miguel Angel Mendez, A Sisyphean Task: The Common Law Approach to
Mens Rea, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 422–23 (1995).
165. Batey, supra note 160, at 344.
166. See People v. Colantuono, 865 P.2d 704, 708 (Cal. 1994) (citing People v.
Hood, 462 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1969)) (noting that when “a conventional specific
intent-general intent inquiry” failed to directly resolve question of whether
intoxication defense applied to assault, the court resorted to policy considerations,
which favored a finding of general intent, precluding intoxication defense).
167. Despite the strong brief submitted by the amici organizations advocating
on behalf of domestic abuse victims, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fleck decision
does not mention any policy considerations in concluding that assault is a generalintent crime to which the intoxication defense does not apply. This absence is
unsurprising given the court’s recent declarations that it is reluctant to invade the
policy-making function of the other branches of government. See, e.g., In re
Welfare of M.L.M., 813 N.W.2d 26, 35 (Minn. 2012) (“These statutes express the
public policy judgments of the Legislature. It is not our role to second-guess these
policy judgments.”); State v. Randolph, 800 N.W.2d 150, 164–65 (Minn. 2011)
(Stras, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In my view, we create too
much uncertainty for litigants when we ignore the clear direction provided by our
rules of procedure in pursuit of the policy or spirit of a rule.”); Laase v. 2007
Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 440 (Minn. 2009) (“[I]t is the role of the
legislature, not the courts, to rewrite the statute . . . . The public policy arguments
therefore should be advanced to the legislature, the body that crafted the
language that compels the result here.”); Morris v. State, 765 N.W.2d 78, 85
(Minn. 2009) (“The development of a state policy on how the right to
misdemeanor appellate counsel in the postconviction setting is vindicated involves
public policy and funding issues that, in the first instance, are better left to the
legislature.”). But see Batey, supra note 160, at 344–61 (identifying cases where
courts’ policy judgments appeared to underlie determinations of whether
particular offenses required specific or general intent).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

27

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 3

2013]

STATE V. FLECK

1507

168

crimes.
Given these concerns, it would be appropriate for the
Minnesota legislature to devise a statutory solution rather than
relying on our state appellate courts to continue wrestling with the
existing statutes, which are often interpreted by reference to the
common law. First and foremost, the legislature should revise
Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 9, to modify the
definitions of mental states and impose a mens rea requirement for
169
each element of an offense. Then, the legislature should take an
offense-by-offense approach to clarifying the mental state required
for specific crimes, including assault.
The drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC), which originally
170
inspired Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 9,
171
The
specifically rejected the general/specific intent dichotomy.
MPC sets forth four distinct mental states: purpose, knowledge,
172
recklessness, and negligence.
In turn, most offenses included in
168. “[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal
punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community,
legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.” United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
169. For a comprehensive discussion of adopting MPC mental states, see Ted
Sampsell-Jones, Mens Rea in Minnesota and the Model Penal Code, 39 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1457 (2013).
170. State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Minn. 1996), superseded by statute,
MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 1(a) (1997).
171. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2), 2.04(1)(a) (Official Draft & Revised
Comments 1985).
172. The four mental states provided by the Model Penal Code are the
following:
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature
or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware
of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that
they exist.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that
such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it
is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
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173

the MPC denote the mental state required.
Assault, under the
MPC, is defined as the following:
(1) Simple Assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:
(a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or
(b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a
deadly weapon; or
(c) attempts by physical menace to put another in
fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
Simple assault is a misdemeanor unless committed in
a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in
which case it is a petty misdemeanor.
(2) Aggravated Assault. A person is guilty of aggravated
assault if he:
(a) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another,
or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life; or
(b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly
causes bodily injury to another with a deadly
174
weapon.
The foregoing definitions of assault have been adopted in
175
When read in conjunction with the MPC
many jurisdictions.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must
be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose
of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor’s situation.
(d) Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it,
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the
circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard
of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
Id. § 2.02(2).
173. Id. explanatory note. For those offenses that do not contain an explicit
mens rea requirement, the MPC instructs how to read such a requirement into an
offense. See id. §§ 2.02(1), (3), (4), (9).
174. Id. § 211.1.
175. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-22 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.
and 1st Spec. Sess.); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.230 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d
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definitions of the culpable mental states, the MPC’s articulation of
assault leaves little to no room for judicial interpretation or
arbitrary enforcement. And by requiring more than a general
176
intent—purpose, knowledge,
or recklessness—the MPC
definition of assault resolves the chief problem created by the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fleck decision: the possibility that a
volitional physical act, unaccompanied by intent to inflict harm,
will create criminal liability. It also resolves another problem
created by Fleck—the fact that Minnesota’s existing assault statute
sets forth one offense that contains two different intent
requirements.
If, in the legislature’s judgment, public policy supports making
the defense of voluntary intoxication unavailable to individuals
charged with assault, the MPC offers another appropriate solution.
Under the MPC, voluntary intoxication, or “self-induced
intoxication,” is not a defense to offenses that contain the element
177
of recklessness.
In the case of assault, as defined by the MPC,
Reg. Sess. and 3rd Spec. Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1203 (West, Westlaw
through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-204 (West, Westlaw
through 2012 2d Reg. Sess. and 1st Extraordinary Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 611 (West, Westlaw through 78 Laws 2012, chs. 204–409); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707712 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.030 (West,
Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess. and 2012 1st Extraordinary Sess.); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 207 (West, Westlaw through 2012 legislation); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-7 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.070 (West,
Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-201 (West, Westlaw
through 2011 legislation); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-310(1)(a) (West, Westlaw
through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:1 (West, Westlaw through
ch. 1, 2013 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.13(a), (b) (West, Westlaw
through 2011 legislation); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.160 (West, Westlaw through
2012 Reg. Sess.); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2701(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012
Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.).
176. Case law exists that equates general intent and the MPC’s knowledge
requirement, but as LaFave explains in his definitive criminal law treatise, the
MPC mental states require knowledge of the attendant circumstances and not just
the absence of accidental conduct. See LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 5.2(b).
177. The Model Penal Code sets forth the following intoxication defense:
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (4) of this Section, intoxication of
the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense.
(2) When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor,
due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would
have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.
(3) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the
meaning of Section 4.01.
(4) Intoxication that (a) is not self-induced or (b) is pathological is an
affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time
of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its
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therefore, a defendant charged with assault cannot rely on
voluntary intoxication to avoid liability.
B.

Encourage the Minnesota Legislature to Amend the Assault
Statutes to More Clearly Define the Prohibited Conduct and
Mens Rea Requirements

If the legislature is unwilling to more explicitly adopt the
mental states outlined in the MPC, the next best solution is for the
legislature to amend the definition of assault within the existing
framework. As previously discussed in Part IV, the two key
problems created in Fleck are the lack of clarity about the conduct
prohibited by the assault-harm statutes and the absence of any
mens rea requirement. The simplest way to address both issues is
to overrule the court’s decision in Fleck and explicitly make assault178
harm a specific-intent crime.
Requiring the defendant to have
acted with the intent to inflict harm clarifies the prohibited
conduct (any act performed with the intent to inflict harm) and
guarantees that the defendant knew the facts that made his
conduct illegal (he performed the act with the intent to inflict
harm). When enacting this change, the legislature should use the
phrase “with intent to” to clearly signal its intent to make assault179
harm a specific-intent crime.
And, as previously mentioned, to
criminality [wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
(5) Definitions. In this Section unless a different meaning plainly is
required:
(a) “intoxication” means a disturbance of mental or physical
capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the
body;
(b) “self-induced intoxication” means intoxication caused by
substances that the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the
tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know,
unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such
circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime;
(c) “pathological intoxication” means intoxication grossly excessive
in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor
does not know he is susceptible.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985).
178. Other states have concluded that assault is a specific-intent crime. See,
e.g., State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 264–65 (Iowa 2010) (holding that assault is
a specific-intent crime despite the Iowa legislature’s attempt to make it a generalintent crime by introducing the assault statute with the phrase “[a]n assault as
defined in this section is a general intent crime.”).
179. See State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012) (“If the Legislature
intended to require an additional, special mental element, it could have defined
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prevent the public policy concerns that the amici in Fleck warned
of, the legislature could simultaneously amend the voluntary
intoxication statute to either limit or prohibit use of the defense in
180
some (e.g., domestic assault) or all cases of assault.
If the legislature is unwilling to overrule the court’s decision in
Fleck and definitively state that assault-harm is a specific-intent
crime, then either the legislature or the courts should clarify the
behavior prohibited under the assault statutes to give fair notice to
citizens. The courts and legislature should look to other states’
assault statutes for language that provides a greater description
than “a physical act.” For example, Utah defines an assault as an
181
act “committed with unlawful force or violence,” and aggravated
assault requires an act that uses “other means or force likely to
182
Other states require
produce death or serious bodily injury.”
contact that a reasonable person would regard as “extremely
183
offensive or provocative.”
And the Supreme Court of Tennessee
has held that specific intent to injure is not necessary to constitute
an assault if the defendant’s conduct “exposes another to personal
184
injury, and does in fact cause such injury.”
All of these
definitions more clearly state the types of physical acts that could
constitute an assault and thereby put citizens on explicit notice as
to what conduct is prohibited.
C.

Recognize Assault and Battery as Two Distinct Crimes

A third, less desirable option is to recognize assault and battery
as two distinct crimes. Historically, assault and battery were
different crimes. At common law, a battery, but not an assault,
assault-harm as ‘an act done with the intent to cause bodily harm to another.’”).
180. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.051 (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Reg.
Sess.) (abolishing the voluntary intoxication defense); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2901.21(C) (Westlaw) (abolishing the voluntary intoxication defense); Montana v.
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (holding, in a plurality decision, that a defendant
does not possess a constitutional right to present evidence of voluntary
intoxication as a defense).
181. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2012 4th
Special Sess.).
182. Id. § 76-5-103(1)(b).
183. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-101(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg.
Sess.); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2011
Reg. Sess. and 1st Called Sess. of 82d Legislature) (defining assault as intentionally
or knowingly causing physical contact that the person causing the contact knows
or should know that the other will regard “as offensive or provocative”).
184. Saunders v. State, 345 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Tenn. 1961) (citation omitted).
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required physical contact in the form of an injury or offensive
touching. An assault, on the other hand, was defined as an
185
attempted battery or an intentional frightening.
Today, several
jurisdictions continue to recognize assault and battery as distinct
186
crimes, while Minnesota and other states have labeled conduct
187
that was traditionally considered a battery as the crime of assault.
Minnesota’s definition of “assault” criminalizes three acts in a
188
(2) assault-harm, and (3)
single sentence: (1) assault-fear,
189
attempted assault-harm.
At present, assault-fear and attempted
assault-harm require specific intent, while assault-harm requires
190
To clean up the statute and establish continuity
general intent.
throughout the assault statute, the legislature could re-define
assault-harm as battery. An “assault” would then be defined
according to common law—as either an intentional frightening or
an attempted battery. Although this change would not remedy the
mental state problems the court introduced in Fleck, it would at
least guarantee that assault—now confined to assault-fear and
attempted assault-harm—is always a specific-intent crime.
Additionally, because a common law battery requires “an offensive

185. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 16.1(a) (2d ed. 2003).
186. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 240, 242 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.
Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 784.011(1), .03 (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Reg.
Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-20(a), 16-5-23(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.
Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-901, -903 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg.
Sess.); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-1, 5/12-3 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 971144 of 2012 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5412(a), 21-5413(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.471(1)(a),
.481(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-3-1, 303-4 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 641, 642
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-2-9(b), (c)
(West, Westlaw through 2012 1st Extraordinary Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2501(a), (b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Budget Sess.).
187. See LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 16.3.
188. MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 10(1) (2012) (“‘Assault’ is . . . an act done
with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death . . . .”).
189. Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 10(2) (“‘Assault’ is . . . the intentional infliction of or
attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another.”).
190. The Minnesota Supreme Court declined to address whether an attempt
to inflict bodily harm is a specific-intent crime. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 312
n.5 (Minn. 2012). But it is axiomatic that attempt crimes require the specific
intent to commit the underlying offense. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 41
(“[C]riminal attempts require proof of an intent to bring about the consequences
set forth in the crime attempted, and this is so even though no such intent is
required for the completed crime”).
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touching,” lawful and benign contact between the alleged offender
191
and victim could not form the basis of a criminal prosecution.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Fleck
highlighted problems within the Minnesota Criminal Code
regarding mental state requirements. In holding that assault-harm
under Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 10,
constitutes a general-intent crime, the court in effect imposed strict
liability for the commission of any volitional physical act that results
in bodily harm to another person. Not only does the court’s
decision conflict with firmly embedded principles of criminal
jurisprudence, it also has the potential to impact several areas of
criminal, civil, and administrative law. To resolve the issues created
in Fleck, the Minnesota legislature should fully adopt the mental
states articulated in the Model Penal Code and integrate those
mental states with the substantive crimes in the Minnesota Criminal
Code.

191. See LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 16.2(a) (stating that most states’ statutes
include a requirement that “the contact be ‘offensive,’ ‘insulting or provoking,’ or
done ‘in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.’”).
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